Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 1

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes




Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND



PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal
and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in
Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.

DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a
certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he
is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.
Cor.)

II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,
which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in
other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by
the mind as a thinking thing.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,
because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is
passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to
express an activity of the mind.

IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as
it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has
all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that
mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea
and its object (ideatum).

V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.

>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing,
or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence
of the thing, but does not take it away.

VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.

VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and