Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
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thing.

>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.

III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from
his essence.

>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering
necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)

*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have
refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have
shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,
as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.
from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my