Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
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meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the
power of God with the human power and right of kings.

IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea
of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he
is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of
the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as
their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are
modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other
attribute.

>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each