Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
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attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through
the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider
things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the
whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as
they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.

VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not
exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the
same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.

<<<<exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the
attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;
and when the particular things are said to exist, not only in so
far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so
far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve
existence, through which they are said to continue.

*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,