Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 9

only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in
respect to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think
the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to
the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God,
which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both
in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have
taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the
first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence,
while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no
attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they
apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are
quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which
they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch
as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine
nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these
persons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to
give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived." (II. Def. ii.)

XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the