Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 32

axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest
connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over
the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit
anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the
causes, whence are derived the terms styled "transcendental,"
such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the
fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of
distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is
I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same
time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be
confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable
of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all
will become entirely confused one with another. This being so,
it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that the
human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,
as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images
become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all
bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the
attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn
from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from
other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;
for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms
represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar
causes arise those notions, which we call "general," such as
man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so
many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in
the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not
indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of
small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.)
and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in