Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 33

which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by
the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to
imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,
bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as
the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected
and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For
instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the
stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of
erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some
other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal
without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
everyone will form general images of things according to the
habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who
seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of
them, so many controversies should have arisen.

*****Note II--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
From particular things represented to our intellect
fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
(II. xxix. Cor.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the
name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.)
From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine
things (II. xviii. Note). I shall call both these ways of
regarding things "knowledge of the first kind," "opinion," or
"imagination." (3.) From the fact that we have notions common
to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II.
xxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call "reason"