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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS Page: 36
idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes
it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These
questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea
is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is
related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of
falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.
with the note. From what is there stated, the difference
between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false
ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question--as to how a
man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects,
I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which
corresponds with its object--in other words, that truth is its
own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it
perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God
(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the
mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
contingent, but as necessary.
>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things
truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in
themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
necessary. Q.E.D.
<<<<imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
future or the past, as contingent.
*****Note--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Cor.) that
the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though
they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude
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