Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 38

imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
present, past, or future.

<<<<things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
specie).

>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not
as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives
this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.),
as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is
the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it
is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of
eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions
(II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which
(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular
thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to
time, under a certain form of eternity.

XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite
essence of God.

>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be
conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of
existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat,
of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are
in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by
another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force