Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 44

the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or
dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore
admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived,
unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.
Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,
than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different
from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected
that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for
affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for
affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen
that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for
as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the
ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems
to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.
Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free
will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally
balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of
hunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a
wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be
meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition