Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
Page: 45

should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by
the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby
we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which
is common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone
suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does
not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of
judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not
free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a
boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as
this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.
Cor.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would