MENO
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me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one
who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I
observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and
good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge
(episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can
be any good men at all.

MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were
we not right in admitting this? It must be so.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true
guides to us of action--there we were also right?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he
have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.

MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'?

SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere
else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right
and good guide?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had
never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows,
he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the
truth?

MENO: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as
knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about
the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of
right action; whereas there is also right opinion.

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will
always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and
sometimes not.

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so
long as he has right opinion?

MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I