PART I: CONCERNING GOD.
Page: 20

attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be
changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed
from true to false, which is absurd.

XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other
words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

>>>>>Proof--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the
proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of
God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute,
and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned
existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in
the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed
to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as
finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea
of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if
the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
point.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the
nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if
it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the