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PART I: CONCERNING GOD. Page: 24
must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this
cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
Q.E.D.
*****Note--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
follows: 1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after
his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot
either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
xxiv. Cor.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
cause of individual things, except for the sake of
distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather
from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote
cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the
effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on
God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the
necessity of the divine nature.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot
be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the
divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the
cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
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