PART I: CONCERNING GOD.
Page: 32

hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things,
as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth
while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,
that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely,
with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God
himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
prone to adopt it?; secondly, I will point out its falsity;
and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices
about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is
not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that
they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first,
that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of
their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their
ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and
desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for
that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it
comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final
causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content,
as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such
causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to
considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have
induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus
they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as
they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which
assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for